{
  "source": "Cooked Index — occupational AI risk register",
  "page": "https://cookedindex.com/jobs/aerospace-engineers/",
  "methodology": "https://cookedindex.com/methodology",
  "notice": "Verdicts are re-examined as evidence accumulates. Re-fetch before relying on this; the page above always carries the current score.",
  "scored_at": "2026-08-11",
  "model": "claude-opus-5",
  "occupation": {
    "title": "Aerospace Engineers",
    "soc_code": "17-2011",
    "category": "Engineering",
    "us_employment": 67710,
    "median_annual_wage": 134960
  },
  "verdict": "EXPOSED",
  "risk_resistance": 48,
  "contested": false,
  "near_boundary": false,
  "dimensions": {
    "task_resistance": 11,
    "embodiment": 7,
    "liability_shield": 8,
    "trust_premium": 7,
    "judgment_accountability": 15
  },
  "reasoning": {
    "task_resistance": "Parametric CAD updates, meshing, CFD/FEA run setup, load-case sweeps, mass-properties bookkeeping and DO-178C/ARP4754 traceability matrices are already being generated or auto-populated by tools, while anomaly resolution during integration, wind-tunnel and flight-test campaigns, and structural test correlation still require an engineer physically reasoning against unexpected data — that split of roughly two-thirds compressible desk output to one-third stubborn empirical work lands it at 11, not in the resistant band.",
    "embodiment": "A 7 reflects that the job is fundamentally screen-based — most weeks never leave the desk — but includes recurring hangar, cleanroom, static-test-rig and tunnel time, walking hardware with technicians during first-article inspection or chasing a fastener interference on the assembly floor, which is more physical presence than a systems analyst and far less than the A&P mechanic doing the actual torqueing.",
    "liability_shield": "An 8 is set by the industrial exemption: Boeing, Lockheed and SpaceX engineers overwhelmingly hold no PE and their names never appear on a stamped drawing, with liability sitting on the company's type certificate — the points come only from the minority holding FAA DER, ODA unit member, or Authorized Representative status where a signed 8110-3 is personally attributable.",
    "trust_premium": "At 7 the deliverable is a drawing package, ICD or stress report that survives review on its technical merit regardless of author, but sustained credibility with the FAA ACO, a customer's chief engineer, or a program's Configuration Control Board is what gets a deviation or waiver accepted quickly — relationship as lubricant, not as product.",
    "judgment_accountability": "15 is earned by calls with no procedural answer: signing off a fatigue life extension on a spar, accepting a nonconformance as use-as-is, judging whether a failed acceptance vibration test invalidates the unit, or being the engineer who says the margin is adequate to fly — decisions where the failure mode is fatalities and the record of that judgment is read out in an NTSB or mishap board."
  },
  "rationale": "The modal aerospace engineer spends most of the day in CAD, CFD/FEA setup and post-processing, trade studies, requirements documents, and test-report writing — all work AI is rapidly compressing, especially parametric sweeps and boilerplate certification paperwork. What holds is physical test and integration (wind tunnel, hardware-in-the-loop, flight test), and above all accountability for airworthiness and safety-of-flight decisions where a wrong call kills people. Licensure is a weak moat because the industrial exemption means most aerospace engineers never stamp anything, though FAA DER/ODA delegated sign-off authority is a genuine and narrower shield.",
  "outlook": "Headcount per program likely falls as AI absorbs analysis and documentation, while demand concentrates on certification-authority holders, test engineers, and integration leads who carry safety accountability.",
  "what_would_raise_it": {
    "levers": [
      {
        "dimension": "liability_shield",
        "change": "FAA expanding and formalizing personal-accountability sign-off for AI-generated compliance artifacts: e.g. an FAA policy/AC under the ODA program requiring a named DER or ODA unit member to personally attest that any AI-produced certification data, stress reports, or MOC findings were independently verified. Precedent exists in post-737MAX Aircraft Certification Reform (ACSAA 2020) tightening ODA oversight and in EASA's AI Roadmap 2.0 'Level 2 AI' human-authority requirements.",
        "plausibility": "plausible",
        "would_add": 5
      },
      {
        "dimension": "liability_shield",
        "change": "Narrowing of the state industrial exemption for safety-critical design, or DoD/NASA contract clauses requiring a licensed PE or named responsible engineer of record on structural/flight-safety analyses — analogous to NASA's Technical Authority chain being written into procurement as a personally-named liability role.",
        "plausibility": "unlikely",
        "would_add": 3
      },
      {
        "dimension": "task_resistance",
        "change": "Genuine two-tier job: if parametric CFD/FEA sweeps, CAD detailing, and cert-paperwork drafting are automated, residual work concentrates in requirements derivation, failure-mode reasoning on novel configurations, anomaly resolution in flight test, and defending analysis to an FAA/EASA authority — tasks that resist without any legal change.",
        "plausibility": "already happening",
        "would_add": 4
      },
      {
        "dimension": "embodiment",
        "change": "Shift of headcount toward test-and-integration roles as design hours compress: wind tunnel campaigns, HIL benches, ground vibration test, flight test instrumentation and on-console anomaly calls. Rising launch and eVTOL flight-test cadence (FAA type certification programs at Joby/Archer) increases the share of the occupation physically present at hardware.",
        "plausibility": "plausible",
        "would_add": 3
      },
      {
        "dimension": "judgment_accountability",
        "change": "Certification frameworks that name an individual as accountable for AI-assisted safety cases — EASA's proposed requirement for a human 'final authority' on Level 2 AI applications, or an ODA procedures manual amendment assigning a specific engineer accountability for AI-derived means of compliance.",
        "plausibility": "plausible",
        "would_add": 3
      }
    ],
    "ceiling_note": "Trust premium has no realistic route: the buyer is an OEM, airline, or government program office purchasing a certified artifact, not a named engineer's judgment; nobody pays extra for human-authored stress reports. Even with strong liability and accountability gains, the ceiling is bounded because the industrial exemption keeps most of the occupation unstamped and headcount tracks program starts, not per-engineer defensibility."
  },
  "adjudication": null,
  "employment_history": {
    "points": [
      {
        "y": 2017,
        "emp": 65760,
        "wage": 113030
      },
      {
        "y": 2018,
        "emp": 63960,
        "wage": 115220
      },
      {
        "y": 2019,
        "emp": 63200,
        "wage": 116500
      },
      {
        "y": 2020,
        "emp": 60630,
        "wage": 118610
      },
      {
        "y": 2021,
        "emp": 56640,
        "wage": 122270
      },
      {
        "y": 2022,
        "emp": 61580,
        "wage": 126880
      },
      {
        "y": 2023,
        "emp": 66660,
        "wage": 130720
      },
      {
        "y": 2024,
        "emp": 68440,
        "wage": 134830
      },
      {
        "y": 2025,
        "emp": 67710,
        "wage": 134960
      }
    ],
    "from": 2017,
    "to": 2025,
    "change_pct": 3,
    "comparable_from": 2019,
    "spans_soc_revision": true
  },
  "pivots": [],
  "license": "https://cookedindex.com/terms"
}