{
  "source": "Cooked Index — occupational AI risk register",
  "page": "https://cookedindex.com/jobs/commercial-pilots/",
  "methodology": "https://cookedindex.com/methodology",
  "notice": "Verdicts are re-examined as evidence accumulates. Re-fetch before relying on this; the page above always carries the current score.",
  "scored_at": "2026-08-11",
  "model": "claude-opus-5",
  "occupation": {
    "title": "Commercial Pilots",
    "soc_code": "53-2012",
    "category": "Transportation",
    "us_employment": 47630,
    "median_annual_wage": 123220
  },
  "verdict": "SAFE",
  "risk_resistance": 73,
  "contested": false,
  "near_boundary": false,
  "dimensions": {
    "task_resistance": 14,
    "embodiment": 15,
    "liability_shield": 17,
    "trust_premium": 11,
    "judgment_accountability": 16
  },
  "reasoning": {
    "task_resistance": "Autopilot handles cruise and coupled approaches, and ForeFlight already does the flight planning and weight-and-balance, but the parts that fill a charter or ag pilot's day — the walkaround finding a nicked prop or hydraulic seep, hand-flying a circling approach into an unlit backcountry strip, dodging a building cell with the radar and Center's help, loading and strapping a medevac patient or a coffin — sit at 14 rather than 18 because the enroute portion genuinely is already flown by machine.",
    "embodiment": "You are strapped into a vibrating cockpit in weather nobody controls: pulling cowling panels, sumping fuel for water, low-level ag passes over wires at 8 feet, night NVG helicopter landings on a highway shoulder — but it stays at 15 rather than 19 because most of the flight is spent seated in a fixed, purpose-built workstation, not crawling through a confined space.",
    "liability_shield": "14 CFR 91.3 makes the pilot-in-command directly responsible for the operation of that aircraft, and your Commercial certificate plus current first- or second-class medical are the things the FAA suspends, the NTSB names, and the insurer prices — a 17 not 20 only because Part 135 operators, dispatchers, and mechanics share exposure with you and the certificate itself is revocable rather than a self-governing professional monopoly.",
    "trust_premium": "Repeat charter clients, ag customers who want the same operator over their fields, and CFI students who follow a particular instructor are real book-of-business, but at 11 it stops short of the relationship being the product — most Part 135 legs are booked through the operator, and the passenger cares about the on-time arrival and the safety record, not your name on the ticket.",
    "judgment_accountability": "The go/no-go with thunderstorms building at the destination, the divert with two hours of fuel and a deteriorating ceiling, the decision to refuse an overweight load or a sick-looking crewmember, and the engine failure at 400 feet where the checklist runs out are yours alone and unreviewable in the moment — 16 rather than 19 because much of the flight is flown to published minimums, SOPs, and checklists that constrain the space you exercise that discretion in."
  },
  "rationale": "Commercial pilots — charter, air taxi, medevac, aerial survey, agricultural application, flight instruction — spend their hours doing things software already does partly (autopilot cruise, flight planning, weight-and-balance math) alongside things it does not: physical preflight walkarounds, hand-flying approaches in gusty crosswinds, loading and securing cargo, and owning the go/no-go call as pilot-in-command. The FAA requires a certificated, medically qualified human in the seat with personal legal liability for the flight, and that regulatory shield — not raw capability — is the thickest moat here; it will erode gradually via single-pilot and remote-supervision rules before it breaks. Uncrewed cargo and Part 135 automation pilots are real and will thin the low-end charter and survey tiers first.",
  "outlook": "Through the 2030s the seat stays occupied and airline hiring keeps pulling experienced pilots upward, but expect single-pilot and remotely supervised cargo rules to squeeze entry-level charter and survey flying first.",
  "what_would_raise_it": {
    "levers": [
      {
        "dimension": "liability_shield",
        "change": "FAA declining to certify reduced-crew or remote-supervised Part 135 operations without an onboard PIC — e.g. if the rulemaking following the Reliable Robotics and Xwing Part 135 exemption petitions ends with an onboard-pilot requirement, or if ALPA-backed language like the 'Safe Landings' / two-crew provisions pushed in FAA Reauthorization debates is enacted into statute rather than left to agency discretion",
        "plausibility": "plausible",
        "would_add": 2
      },
      {
        "dimension": "liability_shield",
        "change": "State or FAA rules extending PIC-equivalent certification and personal liability to the remote operator seat, so that even automated cargo flights require a certificated, medically qualified, individually liable human per flight rather than a fleet monitor — analogous to how EASA's single-pilot ops work has kept a licensed accountable human named per sector",
        "plausibility": "plausible",
        "would_add": 2
      },
      {
        "dimension": "task_resistance",
        "change": "Task-mix shift within the occupation: if cruise-phase and survey-grid flying automates, the residual job concentrates in medevac scene landings, ag application at 10 feet over uneven terrain, mountain and unimproved-strip charter, and flight instruction — tiers where hand-flying and on-scene judgment dominate. This is a genuine two-tier occupation and the surviving tier scores higher than the average",
        "plausibility": "already happening",
        "would_add": 3
      },
      {
        "dimension": "trust_premium",
        "change": "Insurer-driven rather than passenger-driven: if aviation underwriters (e.g. Global Aerospace, USAIG) price hull and liability cover materially higher for reduced-crew Part 135 operations, charter brokers effectively pay for the human crew. Note passenger-side willingness to pay for a human pilot is largely untested and unpriced today",
        "plausibility": "plausible",
        "would_add": 2
      },
      {
        "dimension": "judgment_accountability",
        "change": "NTSB and FAA enforcement practice continuing to name the PIC as the accountable party in automation-involved occurrences, and courts declining to shift that to the manufacturer — each such case reinforces that the consequential call is owned by a person in the seat",
        "plausibility": "already happening",
        "would_add": 1
      }
    ],
    "ceiling_note": "Already near the top on the institutional dimensions; the realistic range is roughly 73–80. The dominant risk is not capability but a single FAA rulemaking on reduced-crew Part 135 ops, which could subtract more than all these levers add. Embodiment cannot rise."
  },
  "adjudication": null,
  "employment_history": {
    "points": [
      {
        "y": 2017,
        "emp": 38490,
        "wage": 78740
      },
      {
        "y": 2018,
        "emp": 37870,
        "wage": 82240
      },
      {
        "y": 2019,
        "emp": 37830,
        "wage": 86080
      },
      {
        "y": 2020,
        "emp": 37120,
        "wage": 93300
      },
      {
        "y": 2021,
        "emp": 42770,
        "wage": 99640
      },
      {
        "y": 2022,
        "emp": 48750,
        "wage": 103910
      },
      {
        "y": 2023,
        "emp": 52750,
        "wage": 113080
      },
      {
        "y": 2024,
        "emp": 51830,
        "wage": 122670
      },
      {
        "y": 2025,
        "emp": 47630,
        "wage": 123220
      }
    ],
    "from": 2017,
    "to": 2025,
    "change_pct": 23.7,
    "comparable_from": 2019,
    "spans_soc_revision": true
  },
  "pivots": [],
  "license": "https://cookedindex.com/terms"
}